Contribution to the analysis of the influence of basic medical coverage on access to care
The case of the social protection system model in Morocco
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.23882/emss26420Palavras-chave:
Basic medical coverage, compulsory health insurance, medical assistance scheme, modele de Grosman, regression linéaire multipleResumo
By reducing the financial risk associated with the onset of illness, health insurance plays a central role for the population. It enables all sick individuals to meet their health expenses and access care. In this way, it helps to improve people's state of health, reduce the financial impact of illness on household budgets, improve the well-being of those insured and, above all, guarantee a system of solidarity between healthy and sick people, thereby promoting social cohesion. The aim of this article is therefore to examine the impact of medical coverage on access to healthcare. The method used to identify the impact of medical coverage on access to care is modeling via logistic regression. To do this, we used a database from the 2019 Household Panel Survey conducted by the Observatoire National de Développement Humain (ONDH), processed using STATA software. The empirical results suggest a positive impact of all selected variables on access to healthcare. The results of our study show that the main explanatory variables impacting access to healthcare are medical coverage, standard of living, level of education and employment. This is followed by other variables with a lesser impact.
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Direitos de Autor (c) 2026 Najia Bensed, Khaoula BELHASSAN
Este trabalho encontra-se publicado com a Creative Commons Atribuição-NãoComercial 4.0.
